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I. Introduction 
There are few things in the world that are as impactful and all pervasive in our daily 
lives as the energy market. Everything from the global economy to the geopolitical 
arena, from the ways wars are fought to the reasons peace is struck, from the way we 
feed our children and keep our elders warm to how we travel, is to a large extent 
decided by how we use energy. Indeed, changes in the makeup of the global energy 
usage have often heralded entirely new eras in our history; think for instance of the 
relationship between the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution, the dawn of the 
Atomic Age or the environmental impact of decades of fossil fuel usage. 
  Currently, the global energy system is again in a period of major upheaval.  
Due to a varied set of causes, ranging from the availability of new technologies to the 
global acknowledgement of climate change, we are currently seeing several 
developments that carry the potential to drastically change the global energy system 
as we know it, or at least make their effects felt not only in the short-term, but also in 
the medium- to long-term. Specifically, these changes are the globalization of the gas 
market and subsequent opportunity to diversify, the rise of renewable energy sources 
(RES) and lower energy prices for longer.  
  In this thesis, we will take a closer look at these changes, and we will do so in 
relation to one of the most important players in the energy field, namely the Russian 
Federation (hereafter Russia). Our concrete research question in this regard is: “How 
do the current changes in the global energy system affect the Russian gas export 
market and strategy?” In assessing this, we will look at both the strictly economic and 
empirical effects (i.e. on ‘the market’) as well as venture more into the theoretical (i.e. 
the effect of an on ‘the strategy’). We will argue that although the Russian gas market 
and strategy are no longer sustainable in the current global system, negative effects to 
its market could mostly be mitigated if the Russian leadership would be willing and 
able to change the strategy behind its gas exports.   
  The choice to analyse the current changes in relation to Russian gas is 
motivated by three main ideas. Firstly, there is a clear gap in the research regarding 
the current changes and their compounded effect on any single player. Secondly, the 
gas market is particularly interesting as a comparison, as it is generally a market that 
develops rather slowly and has traditionally always been highly regionalized and 
inflexible. This is because the physical characteristics of gas a substance meant that, 
until recently, it could only be conveniently transported in one way: by pipeline. As 
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pipelines are inherently rigid in their lay-out (i.e. they cannot be moved) and have a 
limited capacity, they create a very controlled market. This is a major difference with 
for instance the much more liquid oil market (which can be transported by many 
different means of transportation to anywhere) or even liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
The very defined relationship between gas producers and consumers means that there 
are less variables to take into consideration, and looking at the gas market thus gives 
us a clearer delineation between the energy system in its previous form and the effects 
of the changes on that than it would in for instance the case oil.  
  Thirdly, analysing Russian gas is specifically relevant due to the size and 
importance of the country on the natural gas market. Indeed, Russia is the single 
biggest exporter of natural gas in the world and is home to the second largest proved 
reserves (after Iran) (BP, 2017a). Moreover, as the pipeline-based gas market ties 
producers and importers together quite literally, their gas market and strategy is of 
direct influence on one of the most important economic blocs in the world: the 
European Union (EU), whilst they are also developing export capacity to the second 
largest economy in the world: China. Furthermore, Russia relies heavily on the 
income of fossil fuel exports and plans to continue doing so in the future. This means 
that the current changes have an inherently bigger and more visible effect on Russia 
than it does for in example the Netherlands, where incomes from gas exports have 
already taken a back seat in government budget, or Norway, that has hedged its risks 
through its sovereign wealth fund (the market value of which is twice Norway’s GDP) 
(Norges Bank, 2017; World Bank, 2017a). Lastly, Russian gas exports are inherently 
linked to the nation’s politics – it is no secret that Russia on occasion tries to exert 
political power through its gas exports – which make the impact of the current 
changes even more interesting: not only might we expect to discern economic 
consequences, but also political ones. 
  In order to answer our research question accordingly, we will first present a 
literature review. This will go into the current discussion on our topic, or rather lack 
thereof, and assess where the gaps in the research are found. After this, we will give a 
descriptive overview of the Russian gas market as a whole, which will cover all basics 
such as for instance the reserve base, the available infrastructure, and the history and 
architecture of its current market. It is also here that we will present the theoretical 
framework in which the Russian gas strategy must be seen and introduce key concepts 
in this regard. The following chapter will present the main body of the thesis and 
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focus on the actual changes in the system. In each section, we will first illustrate why 
the identified change is so disruptive, after which we will analyse its (potential) 
effects on the Russian gas market and strategy. This will be followed by a general 
conclusion on the compounded effect of the identified changes on Russia.  
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II. Literature Review 
As stated in the previous section, there is distinct lack of research on the compounded 
effect of the current changes in the global energy system on any single player, 
including Russia. Indeed, most research focuses on individual changes and 
furthermore tends to veer towards the economic and empirical side, rather than also 
considering the Russian strategy and foreign policy paradigm. In this chapter, we will 
examine what the current discussion does cover as well as outline why the existing 
gap impedes on our understanding of the Russian gas market.  
 The relatively limited scope of the current research is clearly illustrated by for 
instance an article by the renowned (Russian) energy scholars Tatiana Mitrova, Tim 
Boersma and Anna Galkina: ‘Some Future Scenarios of Russian Natural Gas in 
Europe’ (2016).  In this article, the authors outline five different scenarios for the 
future of Russian gas. The different scenarios are based on four different variables: 
the oil price in the coming years, whether or not current contracts with European 
partners will be extended, the accessibility of Ukrainian transit after the current transit 
contracts expire in 2019, and the possible construction of either Turk Stream (a gas 
pipeline towards Europe via Turkey) or South Stream (a previously shelved pipeline 
project which would provide Russian gas directly to the EU via the Black Sea) 
(Mitrova, 2016).  
  Although the issues chosen by Mitrova are all valid points of discussion, none 
of the scenarios incorporate all three of the changes we identified. For instance, in this 
28-page publication, renewable energy is only mentioned twice, and on both accounts 
it is a secondary concern. Firstly, it mentions that the methodology of establishing the 
future European gas demand can be adjusted ‘if resulting gas prices indicate low 
competitiveness of gas compared with coal, nuclear or renewable energy’ (Idem). The 
second mention concerns the fact that a Southern gas corridor (i.e. the construction of 
either South or Turk Stream) might be less viable than previously expected 
considering the fact that the ‘Italian market requires less natural gas than was 
anticipated some years ago, particularly due to an increased share of renewable 
energy (Idem)’. Both of these instances might imply that renewable energy will have 
a significant effect on the future of Russian gas, but the article fails to assess the 
actual effects and neglects to consider for instance the 2020, 2030 or 2050 European 
Energy Strategy documents. These indicate a projected share of 20%, 27% and 55% 
of renewable energy in the EU’s gross final energy consumption by those respective 
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years, which would inherently have a significant impact on the Russian sales market 
(European Commission, 2017a; European Commission, 2011).  
  Similarly, there is an allusion to the globalization of the gas market and the 
subsequent opportunities to diversify by ways of an assessment of the future gas 
demand in Europe.  However, nowhere does the article mention for instance the 
official initiatives for further diversification by the EU, such as in the Third Energy 
Package and the Energy Union Strategy, which are not only realistic in the light of a 
more globalized gas market, but is in part driving the decentralization of the market 
(Idem). This is especially significant when we consider that these diversification 
policies are to a great extent explicitly targeted towards Russian gas imports 
(European Parliament, 2017).  
  Moreover, although the expected price of natural gas does play a significant 
role in the article – it is mentioned specifically in each scenario – the presumptive 
prices the article refers to have already proven to be incorrect. In no scenario does the 
article presume an oil price of lower than $70 per barrel (bbl) in 2016 and $75/bbl in 
2017, whereas the actual price has not surpassed $50/bbl since late 2015 (Bloomberg, 
2017). This is significant as the price of pipeline gas is generally indexed to the price 
of oil, and as such any article based on the wrong oil prices cannot project the impact 
future of Russian gas accurately.  
  In short, although this article presents a solid projection of future energy 
scenarios from an economically focused, more status quo-based point of view, it lacks 
discussion on the three important changes we will discuss in this thesis. Moreover, it 
lacks an in-depth analysis of the strategic side of the Russian gas market. When we 
look at other scenario-based articles, we see similar issues: a strict economic focus, a 
lack of specificity on gas, or simply a lack of discussion of the three changes.1  
  When we look at publications that do intersect with our topic more explicitly, 
they usually focus on one or the other in regards to the changes we will discuss, and 
can thus also not project the comprehensive implications on either the Russian export 
market or strategy. In order to illustrate this we will highlight some articles in topical 																																																								
1 See: Institut Energeticheskikh Issledovaniy Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk (2016), Prognoz 
Razvitiya Energetiki Mira i Rossii 2016. [pdf] Available from: 
https://www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2016_rus.pdf; Idem (2014), Prognoz Razvitiya Energetiki 
Mira i Rossii do 2040 Goda. [pdf] Available from: 
https://www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2040.pdf ; Paltsev, S. (2014), ‘Scenarios for Russia’s 
Natural Gas Exports to 2050’, Energy Economics, 42, pp. 262-270; Stern J. (2005), The 
Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
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order. Firstly, there are of course many articles available on the effect of the 
globalization of gas and its subsequent impetus for global diversification. However, 
they mostly either focus on the importers’ side of the story or, when they are more 
focused on Russia, do not take into account other changes, such as renewable energy 
or the price slump. In terms of articles that do focus on Russia, The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies’ article by Katja Yafimava titled ‘The EU Third Package for Gas 
and the Gas Target Model: major contentious issues inside and outside the EU’ (2013) 
is a good example of the usually limited scope. She does not mention renewable 
energy a single time and lower prices are only mentioned in passing. Similarly, 
Rosendahl et al’s ‘Globalisation of natural gas markets – effects on prices and trade 
patterns’ (2009) mentions neither renewable energy nor the possible effects of lower 
oil prices, although the article is focused on natural gas pricing. Another example of 
this would be the Institute of Energy Studies Academy of Sciences’ (ERIRAS) 
publication: ‘Gazovy Rynok ES: Epokha Reform’ (2016), which mentions renewable 
energy all of two times in passing and does not go into the current price slump at all.2  
  Secondly, in those publications where renewable energy is mentioned in the 
context of gas markets (which are few to begin with), it is rarely expanded upon and 
lacks specificity vis a vis Russia. Examples of this can be found in for instance 
Timothy Boon von Ochsee’s dissertation The Dynamics of Natural Gas Supply 
Coordination in a New World (2010), which mentions renewable energy at some 
length on four occasions, but none of which in context with Russia. We see something 
similar in Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte’s book Global Energy 
Governance: the New Rules of the Game (2010), even though the title would suggest 
a thorough analysis of a major aspect of the ‘new rules of the game’, namely 
renewables. Correspondingly, where Russia is concerned, the articles published by 
more renewable energy-oriented scholars limit themselves almost strictly to the direct 
effects of renewable usage on the European demand for Russian gas, whilst forgoing 
to assess further effects on Russia, economically and strategically. Indeed, when we 
look at for instance the combined published work of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s 
Energiewende division – Energy Transition, one of the main think tanks on 
sustainable development in Germany and the rest of Europe – there are no articles 
linking to the effects of the rise of renewable energy in Europe on Russia specifically 																																																								
2 ‘Gas Markets in the EU: an Era of Reform’ (all translations by author). 
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available at all.3  
  Thirdly, one should have no trouble finding assessments of how Russia is 
affected by the current slump in fossil fuel prices – such as in Aleksandra Malova and 
Frederick van der Ploeg’s article ‘Consequences of lower oil prices and stranded 
assets for Russia's sustainable fiscal stance’ – but these are mostly assessments of the 
Russian economy as a whole, with no specific mention of the gas market at all. Where 
this tie is explicitly made, such as in for instance Henderson and Grushevenko’s 
‘Russian Oil Production Outlook to 2020’ (2017) there is again little attention for the 
effect of non-economic factors or other changes (such as the globalization of the gas 
market or the rise of renewable energy).  Indeed, neither renewable energy nor 
globalization or the subsequent opportunity to diversify in gas is mentioned in this 
publication. Indeed, this is a recurrent theme as those engaged with oil and gas 
economics usually do not consider less financially tangible aspects of a market and 
thus forgo on large parts of the considerations driving the market.4 Consequently, 
these articles often also fail to delve into the strategic considerations associated with 
changes on the Russian gas market whilst in cases where a connection to policy and 
strategy is made, such as in for instance George Friedman’s Forbes article ‘Low Oil 
Prices Will Make Russia More Aggressive In 2017’ (2017) or ‘The Effects of Lower 
Oil Prices on Russia’ by Ekaterina Grushevenko (2016), we cannot speak of a 
thorough academic analysis. These articles do underline the importance of a broader 
analysis though; the effects of changes in the gas market usually reach far beyond 
their original realm and a strictly economic analysis is thus of limited value.  
  In essence, after a general reading of publications that intersect with our topic, 
it is clear that there is a gap in the research where the compounded effect of these 
three big developments is concerned. Indeed, the only scholar who approaches a 
discussion of all three would be Professor Andrey Konoplyanik of the Gubkin 
Russian State University of Oil and Gas. In his work ‘Rossya: Slozhnaya Adaptatsiya 
																																																								
3 To see a collection of their work on Russia, see: 
https://energytransition.org/page/2/?s=russia&submit=Search  
4 For more examples see: European Commission (2016), Impact of Low Oil Prices on Oil 
Exporting Countries. [pdf] Available from: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC101562/jrc101562_impact%20of
%20low%20oil%20prices%2020160512.pdf; U.S. Energy Information Agency, Low oil 
prices have affected Russian petroleum companies and government revenues. Available from: 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28432 [Accessed: May 23, 2017]. 
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k Novym Realiyam Evropeyskogo Gazovogo Rynka5’ (2014), he mentions all three 
changes and discusses them at some length. Nevertheless, his focus is again limited in 
the sense that he uses all current changes in the European market (short- and long-
term) to argue for the restart of negotiations of the South Stream pipeline. Thus, even 
though he does acknowledge all aspects, we cannot speak of an in-depth analysis of 
the compounded effects of these particular changes on both the Russian gas market 
and strategy, something that is underlined by the wide scope and yet humble length of 
the publication (16 pages).  
  A final point that should be made is the fact that most of these publications 
limit themselves to the Russian-European energy nexus. This choice is of course well 
explicable as Europe is certainly Russia’s biggest gas market, but it is also another 
limitation of the current research. Although the centre of gravity for this thesis will 
also be Europe we will not limit ourselves to this geographical region per se. Indeed, 
where relevant, it is even essential to also outline the effect the current changes have 
on other sectors of the Russian gas market, such as the Chinese connection, as our 
research question does not pertain only to Russian-European gas.  
  In conclusion, although there is a substantial body of research available on the 
different aspects that this thesis will cover, there is a clear gap where the compounded 
effects of the three changes we identified is concerned. Not yet has a scholar included 
all these effects in the same research and applied them specifically to the Russian case 
whilst also including the strategic implications of the combined changes. This thesis 
aims to close this gap in the research, as a comprehensive understanding of the effects 
of these changes is crucial in order to better grasp the current state of affairs of the 
Russian gas market. In the following chapter, we will start our analysis by first giving 
an overview of the Russian gas market, since it would be impossible to assess the 
effect of any change without being familiar with the status quo.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
5 ‘Russia: a Difficult Adaptation to the New Realities of the European Gas Market’. 
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III. The Basic of Russian Gas 
In this chapter, we will go through the development of the Russian gas market and 
strategy in order to establish both the tangible and theoretical framework in which the 
current changes must be perceived. Firstly, we will give an overview of the basics of 
Russian gas. This will include the size of the resource base, the geographical 
distribution of said resources and the currently available and planned infrastructure. 
After this, we will discuss how the market developed since the first cross-border gas 
exports in the late 1940s and what it looks like today. This will be followed by an 
analysis of the theoretical framework in which the Russian gas market must be 
viewed. In this last section, we will introduce some key theoretical concepts in order 
to better illustrate the non-tangible considerations that have to be taken into account 
when talking about the Russian gas market.  
 
III.i Reserves 
Russia is the single biggest gas exporter globally, accounting for nearly 19% of all gas 
exports and 25,8% of all pipeline exports (BP, 2017a). Moreover, with 32.3 trillion 
cubic meters (tcm) of proved reserves, or 17.3% of the global total, Russia houses the 
second largest proved gas reserves in the world after Iran (Idem). Moreover, these 
numbers only apply to proved reserves, leaving out any potential future discoveries, 
reserves that have been discovered but are not yet economic to extract and estimated 
reserves, whereas there is strong preliminary evidence to believe that these are also 
sizeable in Russia. For instance, according to the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS), the Arctic houses over 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas whilst Russia 
currently has a claim pending at the UN for almost half of that territory (see Figure 1) 
(USGS, 2009; UNCLOS, 2016). Indeed, according to a different USGS study, 58% of 
all undiscovered gas in the Arctic might be located in the West Siberian Basin and 
East Barents Basin alone (USGS, 2008).6 In short, when we look at Russia’s gas 
reserves, there is no doubt about its role as a major player, and considering the 
potential of future discoveries, this is not set to change in the medium or even long 
term.  
 
																																																								
6 These numbers are not proved reserves and thus have to be taken askance, but are estimated 
at 27.5 tcm, or a 85% increase of Russia’s reserves (USGS, 2008). 
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III.ii Distribution 
The world’s gas and oil reserves are distributed highly asymmetrically; over seventy 
per cent of these reserves are located within a strategic ellipse, often called the 
‘Eurasian ellipse’ (see Figure 2) (Boon von Ochsée, 2010). Even within this ellipse, 
gas is more asymmetrically distributed than oil, with Russia, Iran and Qatar housing 
more than half of the global natural gas reserves, again underlining the importance of 
Russia as a player on the global gas market (Idem).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Russian Claims 
of the Arctic as made to 
the UN under United 
Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Source: 
United Nations (2016). 	
Figure 2. The 
Eurasian Gas 
Ellipse. Source: 
Boon von Ochsée 
(2010). 
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Consequently, the gas supplies within Russia are also quite centralized. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, the majority of (currently proved) Russian gas reserves are located in 
the Nadym-Pur-Taz region in Western Siberia, followed by Eastern Siberia and the 
far North, surrounding the Yamal peninsula and the Barents Sea.  
 
 
There are many ways to distinguish between different fields and these methods 
usually refer to the status of the reserves, i.e. have they been fully ascertained through 
drilling or are they merely estimates based on seismic research? For the scope of this 
thesis, we shall make a different distinction however, conform the one that Timonthy 
Boon von Ochsée makes in his previously mentioned dissertation The Dynamics of 
Natural Gas Supply Coordination in a New World. He identifies three different types 
of fields, based on their production rather than only the reserves as such: mature fields 
(or ‘brown fields), fields with a flat production profile and new gas fields (or ‘virgin 
fields’) (Boon von Ochsée, 2010).  
  Boon von Ochsée’s distinction is highly relevant to us as it gives insight in 
how the production of natural gas will develop over the next decades. Most important 
in this regard is the fact that the three biggest gas field – Medvezhe (with a total 
assessed size of 2.69 tcm), Urengoy (2.5 tcm) and Yamburg (2.6 tcm), generally 
referred to as ‘the big three’ (see Figure 3) – are all ‘very mature’ (Boon von Ochsée, 
Figure 3. Major Gas Fields and Supply Infrastructure in Russia. Source: IEA (2011). 
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2010). This means that they have passed peak production and are now in decline. In 
his book The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom (2005), Jonathan Stern assesses 
that these fields are now declining a rate of around 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) per 
year.7 Thus, these fields will have to be retired in the medium-term, indicating the 
need for massive investments in new fields in the not too distant future. 
  Other, smaller fields, mostly in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region are currently in a 
phase of flat production, with some of them – the relatively big Zapolyarnoye for 
instance – nearing ‘brown status’. This means that enhanced extraction techniques 
must be used (see Shepherd & Shepherd, 1997), which again indicates big 
investments and a limited lifespan. 
  The last category is that of the virgin fields, of which Russia has many. The 
ones designated for production in the short term are the Kovykta and 
Bovanenkovskoe fields (with assessed reserves 2.5 and 4.9 tcm respectively), the 
latter of which has already been brought online (the final pipeline to connect it to the 
general gas pipeline grid became operational in 2017) (Gazprom, 2017a; Gazprom, 
2017b; Boon von Ochsée, 2010). Kovytka in turn has not been connected yet, but is 
currently in the pilot phase, which constitutes mostly of geological exploration 
(Gazprom, 2017b).  
  Other promising virgin fields are located in the Barents Sea (the Shtokman 
field there is as large as all of Norway’s combined reserves) and on the Yamal 
peninsula (Boon von Ochsée, 2010) However, the development of these fields will 
demand immense upfront investment, and any development in the Arctic is currently 
doubtful given the Western sanctions regime, which includes the transfer of 
specialized oil and gas technology (see chapter IV.iii). Overall, it is mainly important 
to note however that although Russia clearly houses enough natural gas supplies for 
decades to come, all of these fields need new investment, which incidentally come on 
top of expected investments in the current infrastructure, much of which dates from 
Soviet times (Stern, 2009).  
 
 
 
 																																																								
7 For more information on (brown field) gas production see: Shepherd D. & Shepherd W. 
(1997), Energy Studies, Second Edition, (Imperial College Press, London).  
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III.iii Infrastructure 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the transmission system for Russian gas export is heavily 
pivoted towards Europe. Indeed, 83% of all Russian pipeline exports go West, with 
another 13.7% going to Turkey (BP, 2017a). The majority of these exports run 
through four major pipelines. Firstly, there is the Urengoy-Uzhgorod, or 
‘Brotherhood’ pipeline system (marked pipeline number 3 on Figure 4), which 
consists of four pipelines and runs from the ‘big three’ fields to Europe through 
Ukraine with a combined yearly capacity of over 100 bcm (Gazprom Export, 2017a; 
Gazprom, 2017c).  
  Secondly, there is the Yamal-Europe and Northern Lights pipelines (marked 
number 2 on Figure 4), which run largely parallel and can carry up to 77.9 bcm per 
annum to Europe through Belarus and Poland (Gazprom 2017d; Yafimava, 2009). 
This is followed by Nord Stream, which runs from Vyborg to Greifswald (Germany) 
and has a total per annum capacity of 55 bcm and Blue Stream, which runs straight to 
Turkey from Dzhubga and has a capacity of 16 bcm per annum (Gaprom, 2017e; 
Gazprom, 2017f). 
  As of now, there are no functional pipelines of significance leading anywhere 
but Europe or Turkey. However, in 2014 construction commenced on a 38 bcm 
capacity pipeline, known as the ‘Power of Siberia’ (marked number 12 on Figure 4) 
that would run from the previously mentioned Kovytka gas field to the North-East of 
the Chinese border (Gazprom, 2017g). According to Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller, 
construction on this is currently ahead of schedule, with 720 km of a total 3000 km 
built. Nevertheless, the completion of the project is not planned until 2025, and no 
formal terms for gas delivery have been signed yet (Slav, 2017).   
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All other proposed export pipelines (marked 7, 8 and 11 on Figure 4) are currently 
uncertain. The Power of Siberia 2 (also known as the ‘Altay’ pipeline) is indefinitely 
postponed after disagreements over pricing, whilst the construction of the third and 
fourth pipeline on the Nord Stream system (known as ‘Nord Stream 2’) is highly 
contended within the EU (Vedomosti, 2015; European Parliament, 2015). 
Construction on Turk Stream meanwhile might or might not have commenced, with 
few reliable sources available on the actual proceedings. Although Gazprom, RIA 
Novosti and Russia Today have confirmed the start of construction on the Russian 
offshore part, it is yet unclear how the project will develop amidst geopolitical 
tensions between Turkey and Russia as well as doubts about the financial viability of 
the project (Gazprom, 2017h; RT, 2017; Ria Novosti, 2017). Moreover, there is 
currently only one functional LNG export plant in Russia; the Gazprom-led Sakhalin 
project (marked 8 on Figure 4). Additionally, the Novatek-led Yamal LNG facility is 
projected to come on stream in 2017, but it is yet unclear whether this goal will be 
achieved whilst all other LNG projects are delayed or indefinitely postponed 
(Henderson, 2017; Mitrova, 2013). 
  In conclusion of this section, when we look at the basics of Russian gas, there 
are a few things that we must consider throughout this thesis. The sheer size of 
Russian reserves mean that it will remain a relevant player for some time to come, but 
between the depleting fields and the pivoted, highly rigid infrastructure, the market is 
already under some pressure. This is important to consider whilst we assess the effect 
of the current changes on the system, as any pre-existing problems might be 
compounded by them or vice versa.  
 
III.iv The Market 
III.iv.i History 
Russia started natural gas exports stem from the late 1940s, when it started exporting 
to Poland on a small scale (Smeenk, 2010). Meanwhile, the domestic energy demand 
in Russia saw a great increase in this period, which presented an impetus to develop 
the natural gas sector further. Although relatively modest, the first substantial 
infrastructure was constructed in this time, when the industries around Saratov and the 
Moscow region started being provided with gas from smaller fields West of the Urals 
and in Ukraine (Idem). 
  The next big development in Russian gas happened under Krushchev, who, in 
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order to make his economic goals reality, focused on gas as a modern fuel with 
flexible application (Victor & Victor, 2006). In this time, the gas infrastructure was 
expanded and Russia was connected to fields in Turkmenistan through the Caucasus 
and further fields in Ukraine (Smeenk, 2010). Although this was of course a domestic 
market at the time – all nations involved were Soviet Republics – it is generally seen 
as the start of Russia’s dominance on the Eurasian gas market (Idem; Victor & Victor, 
2009; Lee & Connolly, 2016).  
  In the eighth Five Year Plan (1966-1971), Brezhnev solidified the importance 
of gas for the Russian Republic as further exploration was conducted and new 
infrastructure led to the first international exports, including to the West. Between 
1967 and 1969, the ‘big three’ were discovered, and further discoveries were made in 
the Yamal and Orenburg region (north of Kazakhstan) (Smeenk, 2010). Furthermore, 
in 1968 the first part of the ‘Brotherhood’ system came online, supplying 
Czechoslovakia with gas from Eastern Ukraine (Victor & Victor, 2006). This was 
followed by the first exports to Western countries: in 1968 Austria became the first 
Western country to sign a gas contract with the USSR, followed by Italy and West 
Germany in 1969 and 1970 respectively (Lee & Connolly, 2016). 
  Shortly after the first supply contracts between the USSR and Western 
countries were signed, big infrastructure investments were made. This resulted in the 
construction of the Transgas pipeline cluster – providing natural gas to Austria 
(1974), Italy (1974) West and East Germany (1976) and France (1978) – and the 
Orenburg pipeline, supplying Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria (1975) (Victor & 
Victor, 2006). Additionally, the USSR started supplying small quantities of gas to 
Finland in this period (Idem). 
   Nevertheless, it was only after the construction of the Transgas and Orenburg 
pipeline clusters that the deals that most fundamentally shaped the Russian gas export 
market were signed: the ‘gas-for-pipe’ deals. After the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, the 
vested interest of the USSR and its import partners to further develop the international 
gas trade grew significantly (Idem; Lee & Connolly, 2016; Smeenk, 2010). Gas had 
become an increasingly important substitute to oil in Europe, whilst the USSR could 
charge a premium price for it. However, as demand grew and the previously 
developed fields started being depleted, the USSR was forced to start development on 
the bigger fields discovered under Brezhnev, all east of the Urals. Due to a lack of 
hard currency to make the necessary investments for the development of these fields, 
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as well as a lack of technological know-how, the USSR thus made a deal with several 
Western actors: in exchange for technological know-how and hard cash payments, 
they were guaranteed gas deliveries in the future (Gustafson, 1985; Victor & Victor, 
2016).  The projects agreed upon through the ‘gas-for-pipe’ deals were carried out 
throughout the 1980s and by the time of its full completion in 1991, the infrastructure 
built under these deals reached a total capacity of 180 bcm. Apart from being the most 
decisive period in terms of infrastructure, this time also marks the full establishment 
of Russia’s modus operandus in the gas market: even now, Russia prefers to work on 
the base of the same long-term contracts (Victor & Victor, 2006).   
 
III.iv.ii Current Status 
The current Russian gas market would be best described as a reinforcement of the 
system developed during the ‘gas-for-pipes’ era. Although the market grew and new 
infrastructure was built, the fundamentals of the market have barely changed, and 
even where Russia has actively sought to change the market, this has materialized 
only at a glacial pace (such as in the development of LNG facilities). Since 1990, 
Russian (pipeline) gas exports have grown from 110 bcm to 190.8 bcm in 2016, 
whilst export capacity has grown by 71 bcm for pipeline gas (through the addition of 
Blue and Nord Stream) (Gazprom Export, 2017b; BP, 2017a; EEGA, 2013). 
However, these developments did not fundamentally alter the market, as the direction 
of the flow of gas remained largely the same.  
  Furthermore, the vast majority of Russian gas is still sold on the basis of long-
term contract with take-or-pay clauses. These contracts are a remnant of the ‘gas-for-
pipes’ era and are based on three major principles: the contracts run for over 20 years, 
the prices are linked to oil prices (and periodically revised) and the buyer needs to but 
a minimum of gas or pay for that minimum anyway (take or pay) (Gazprom, 2017i). 
Currently, over 82% of Russian gas exports is tied up in long-term contracts, with 
another 4 tcm contracted for the future (Gazprom, 2015; Gazprom, 2017i). This is so 
designed as to guarantee stability of the market and return on investment for the 
producer (having made huge capital investments to develop the fields) but is a model 
that the rest of the globe is moving away from (see chapter IV.i).  Similarly rigid and 
another leftover of Soviet times is that all Russian pipeline exports are still in the 
hands of one company: Gazprom.  
  Another point in which the market has not seen any fundamental changes is 
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the role gas still has in the Russian budget. As was the case during ‘gas-for-pipes’, 
and led the ideologically opposing Soviet Union to trading with the West on a 
massive scale, the hard currency derived from natural resource exports is still crucial 
to the Russian budget. Historically, the share of gas revenues in the Russian budget 
moved between 17% and 25%. Although this has dropped to 16% and 6.7% in 2015 
and 2016 respectively as a result of the 2014 oil price crash there is no denying that 
just as in the ‘gas-for-pipes’ era, gas revenue is still a fundamental part of the Russian 
budget (Idem; Bloomberg, 2017).8  
  Of course, the fact that the market has not fundamentally altered itself does 
not mean that it has been at a standstill. On a smaller scale, the current market is 
somewhat different. For instance, the construction of the Power of Siberia shows a 
potential shift in focus, as does the fact that Russia now exports a modest 14 bcm of 
LNG (or 4% of global LNG sales) to different Asian countries (BP, 2017a). Indeed, 
the rise of LNG is perhaps the biggest change in the Russian gas market to date, but 
development has been very sluggish. Despite being deemed a top priority by the 
government, as is for instance illustrated by the fact that they to a limited extent allow 
companies other than Gazprom to export LNG in order to incentivize more 
production, there is only one LNG facility currently on stream: Sakhalin in the Far 
East (Mitrova, 2013; IGU, 2017).  
  In short, the market as it stands now is quite traditional: it is focused on the 
historical centres of demand whilst basing itself on a dated contractual model. Active 
attempts to renew the market have proven difficult, as is shown by the lack of active 
LNG plants and for instance the failure to launch the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. 
 
III.v The Strategy 
Now that we have assessed the tangible aspects of Russian gas, i.e. where it is, how it 
moves and where and how it is sold, it is important to also look at the more abstract 
aspect of it, i.e. the strategy behind Russia’s exports. Some fringe scholars might 
argue that Russia is a purely rational economic actor when it comes to its gas exports 
(in which case a description of the strategy could be very succinct), whereas in fact, 
(geo)political considerations are a well-known component of the Russian gas strategy. 
In this section, we will analyse the theoretical framework in which the Russian gas 																																																								
8 Oil indexed prices generally show a delay of a year due to the periodical revision, see 
chapter IV.iii. 
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market functions as this is crucial to understanding the market and how it might 
develop in the future. 
   Since we presume that the Russian gas export market is, at least to a large 
extent, part of the political realm, it cannot be seen outside of the broader context of 
Russia’s foreign policy. As gas exports are only one component of Russia’s foreign 
policy, they cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Although the scope of this thesis of 
course does not allow for a full analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, there are some 
markers we can identify in order to better comprehend the strategy behind it and its 
gas exports. 
  When international relations theory in its current form gained traction after 
World War II, Russia was not privy to its development, as it was ruled under one 
strict paradigm: Marxism. In the 1990s this paradigm was renounced as Russia sought 
its new identity. The perestroika and early years of Yeltsin’s rule were marked by a 
budding liberalism among Russia’s leaders (Romanova, 2012; Tsygankov, 2010). 
Liberalism is defined by cooperation, mutual benefits, absolute gains, a great 
importance attached to international organisations and free trade (Cristol, 2011a). In 
those early years, Russia did seem to ascribe to this; its eagerness to cooperate with 
the West (both directly and through the OSCE and UN), radical economic reform 
(which moved to liberalize the Russian economy) and the decentralization of power 
under Yeltsin all indicated that Russia would join the ranks of liberal democracies 
(Tsygankov, 2010; Suny, 2007). Indeed, it even prompted Francis Fukuyama’s 
standard work The End of History, which declared the victory of liberalism and 
defended the idea of global ascendancy of Western-style capitalism (Tsygankov, 
2010).  
  Russia’s liberal period was short-lived however. The Russian leadership 
quickly grew weary of the West’s one-sided approach and positive results failed to 
materialize as expected. Rather than integrating Russia into its fold, Russia felt it was 
being assimilated on terms set by the US without receiving anything in return (either 
politically or economically) (Idem). Thus, the political paradigm started changing 
again and as Yeltsin started underlining the importance of Russia’s ‘national interest’ 
and liberal economic reform was somewhat curbed, the Russian leadership moved 
towards a more neo-realist view of foreign relations (Idem). 
  Realism is an international relations theory based on power politics. It 
assumes that states are the most important foreign policy actors and that these actors 
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exist in an anarchic world, i.e. a world without a global arbiter. In this anarchic 
system, states are driven only by their national interest, which is to preserve and 
enhance its power vis a vis other states (it is thus a zero-sum game based on relative 
gains). Here, power is equated with military power (Cristol, 2011b). Moreover, in 
classical realist theory, the state’s drive for power dominates all other motivations, 
and as the drive for power exists only in relation to others, the state thus only acts in 
reaction to external forces and internal politics do not have an effect on a state’s 
foreign policy (Idem; Tsygankov, 2010). This concept is famously explained by the 
‘billiard ball analogy’: the trajectory of a billiard ball (i.e. ‘state’) is only affected by 
external forces (‘other states’) and not by its internal structure or content (‘domestic 
politics’) (Romanova, 2012). Over time however, the realist school of thought has 
evolved to neorealism (or ‘structural realism’), which includes all means of power 
rather than just military power, and neoclassical realism, which to a greater extent 
includes the influence internal actors and policies have on foreign policy.  
  After liberalism went out of fashion in Russia, neorealism became the 
dominant paradigm. It is said that this worldview gained traction so quickly because it 
aligns closely to Russia’s history (Idem). The country has a traditionally strong 
central state power and has often identified itself only vis a vis others; the always 
returning debate about Russia as a Western state, Eurasian exception or Asian nation 
comes to mind here. Moreover, its weak civil society strengthens the idea that internal 
politics do not influence its foreign policy to a great extent (Idem; Boon von Ochsée, 
2010). 
  In the late 1990s and early 2000s it became evident that neorealism was 
indeed the new dominant foreign policy paradigm in Russia as Putin’s domestic and 
external policies were all geared towards the re-establishment of Russia as a strong 
state. This is for instance illustrated by his ‘power vertical’, the power show of Russia 
in the Second Chechen war (1999-2000) and his taking key industries back under 
state control. Indeed, the realist paradigm clearly speaks from the Natural Security 
Concept of the Russian Federation released in 2000, which literally states that: 
‘Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty 
and strengthening its positions as a great power’ (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del 
Rossiyskoy Federatsy, 2000). More recent illustrations of Russia’s realist viewpoint 
are its actions in relation to the crisis in and around Ukraine and its participation in 
the Syrian conflict.   
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  In fact, neorealism as a foreign policy paradigm has established itself with 
such dominance, that, according to the Saint Petersburg State Univeristy professor 
Tatiana Romanova, all other foreign policy paradigms are considered ‘evil and not 
meaningful for science’ (Romanova, 2012). To her, the only debate that is currently 
relevant is whether Russia still adheres to neorealism or is venturing more towards 
neoclassical realism (which does take internal happenings into consideration). She 
argues that since the protests of 2011, the Russian leadership might lean more towards 
the latter, as the risk of losing popular support is more tangible now (Idem). 
  So what does this mean for the Russian gas strategy? As we have already 
established, the neorealist foreign policy paradigm includes not only military power, 
but pertains to all levels of relative power, including the economic. As neorealism 
also dictates that the state is the most important foreign policy actor, the logical 
consequence of this would be that the gas industry is to be state-managed in order to 
maximize Russia’s power vis a vis other states. In economic theory, this is more 
commonly known as mercantilism; an approach that ‘promotes 
governmental regulation of a nation’s economy for the purpose of augmenting state 
power at the expense of rival national powers’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017).  
  It must first be noted that it is common to have a certain degree of government 
control in the gas industry due to the strategic properties of energy in general and the 
complexities of gas development, transit and distribution specifically. In the Russian 
case however, it is clear that the government’s involvement goes far beyond simply 
assisting the market. It is tempting to link this to the Soviet origins of the Russian gas 
system. One might assume that as the market came to full form in a centralized, 
socialist system, the current reality is simply inherited from this. However, to do so 
would forgo on the fact that in the 1990s – indeed when Russia’s leadership took a 
more liberal approach to foreign policy – the gas market was significantly freer than it 
is now.  For instance, after the establishment of Gazprom as a joint-stock company in 
1992, the Russian government never held a controlling stake in the company in the 
1990s (Victor & Victor, 2006). As of 2005, however, this stake is just over 50% 
(Smeenk, 2010; Gazprom, 2017j). Another example is the establishment of the 
Energy Charter Treaty in this period; a multilateral, legally binding agreement with 
regards to the integration of the European energy market (International Energy 
Charter, 2015a). Although Russia ended up pulling out of the agreement later, this is 
indicative of the trend in the 1990s, as commitment to a multilateral framework is 
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typically liberal (International Energy Charter, 2015b). 
  In fact, it is the Putin era that has brought on a more mercantilist approach. 
Indeed, most scholars agree that one of Putin’s main policy pillars is to ‘catch up with 
the West through imposing state control over the ownership and management of 
mineral resources’ (Legvold, 2007; Olcott, 2004). This is not only apparent from the 
reality of the current export market, but has also been clearly vocalized by Putin 
himself. Most importantly, Putin wrote his Kandidat thesis on the management of 
natural resources in 1997, followed by an article for the journal of the Gorky Mining 
Institute in 1999, titled ‘Mineralno syr’evyye resursy v strategii razvitiya Rossiyskoy 
ekonomiki9’. Although the thesis has since been declared classified and there is even 
some discussion on whether either publication is actually authored by Putin, these 
documents are generally considered to be an accurate description of his approach to 
the natural resource sector (Balzer, 2005; Jack, 2006). 
  In short, according to recollections of those who read it, his thesis makes a 
dual argument: on the one hand, he argues that it is fundamental to the prosperity of 
Russia that the state take the lead in the natural resource sector whilst on the other 
hand, the state must not be so involved as to deter foreign investment (from the West) 
(Idem; Balzer, 2005). Although the latter half of this argument is seemingly not in 
accordance with classical mercantilism, the argument can also be made that if 
Western investments eventually result in a better functioning (i.e. more profitable) gas 
sector, they would still serve the purpose of enhancing Russia’s relative (economic) 
power. Furthermore, by dictating the terms on what is ‘too much’ government 
involvement and what is acceptable, the state essentially still keeps control over the 
sector, which again aligns with the definition of mercantilism. 
  The second publication that underlines Putin’s mercantilist tendencies is the 
aforementioned article on mineral resources in Russia’s foreign policy strategy. Here, 
he makes the same point regarding the state’s role in the natural resource sector whilst 
underlining the danger of deterring investors, but he also places it in the broader 
perspective of global politics. In the article he states that ‘the presence of a strong 
natural resource potential in Russia gives it a special place amongst industrialized 
nations’, and that the effective use of this potential ‘is one of the most important 
prerequisites to Russia making a sustainable entrance into the world economy’ (Putin, 																																																								
9 ‘Mineral natural resources in the strategy for development of the Russian economy’  
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1999). He later adds that the state of the country’s ‘mineral and raw materials 
complex’ remains the ‘most important factor’ in ‘reestablishing Russia’s former 
power on a qualitatively new basis’ (Idem). He furthermore underlines the importance 
of the natural resource sector by indicating that he sees this sector dominating 
Russia’s economy for at least another 50 years. (Idem). 
  In order to maximize the potential of the country’s national resources, Putin 
proposes the creation of ‘state-dominated, vertically integrated financial-industrial 
groups to compete with Western multinationals’ (Idem). These firms shall receive 
both legislative and financial support from the state on the condition that they serve 
the state well, i.e. provide it with sufficient resources, increase profits and efficiency, 
and support and expand exports (Idem; Olcott, 2004). 
  When we look at the reality of the market, we see Putin’s thesis and article 
clearly reflected in his policies. Bringing Gazprom back under state control and 
rejecting the Energy Charter Treaty are merely two examples of this in a long list of 
policies aimed at reinforcing the state’s control over the sector. Indeed, even the arrest 
of Yukos CEO Khodorkovsky in 2003 is rumored to, in part, a response to his plans 
to sell a significant share (up to 40%) of Yukos company to ExxonMobil (Idem; 
Balzer, 2005). The fact that the attack on Yukos was initiated by state-owned oil 
major Rosneft (that later acquired all Yukos assets) and supported by – the also state-
owned – Transneft seem to confirm this (Olcott, 2004). Moreover, it shows that the 
idea of state control seemingly counts heavier for the state than the risk to deter 
investors; the arrest of Khodorkovsky triggered a lot of suspicion in the West.  
  After the arrest of Khodorkovsky and subsequent liquidation of Yukos, Putin’s 
intentions became ever clearer. In 2004, he annulled the results of a 1993 tender for 
the development of three Sakhalin parcels, which was then awarded to ExxonMobil, 
Chevron and Rosneft. In its place, he announced the sale of a $1 billion exploration 
license. This was a clear move to push the two foreign companies out of Sakhalin, 
which was especially radical when considering that Exxon had already invested $80 
million in the project (Olcott, 2004). In 2005, he brought Gazprom back under state 
control. Apart from acquiring a majority share, a law was also adopted that the 
Russian state shall ‘possess no less than 50% plus one share’, which was followed by 
the establishment of an official gas export monopoly for Gazprom in 2006 (Gazprom, 
2017k). Although the provision that foreigners shall own no more than 20% of 
Gazprom shares was lifted in this period as well, it is still prohibited for foreigners to 
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directly own Gazprom stock (Idem; Victor & Victor, 2006).10  
  In 2008, Putin ensured continuous state involvement in strategic economic 
sectors by adopting a federal law ‘On the Procedures for Foreign Investments in 
Companies of Strategic Significance for National Defense and Security’ (Baker 
McKenzie, 2017a). This law stipulates a range of restrictions on foreign ownership of 
‘strategic assets’, including ‘all activities related to geological research of subsoil or 
mineral exploration and extraction of federal subsoil’ (Idem). If a foreign entity wants 
to acquire a ‘controlling share’ in these companies (‘controlling’ being defined as 
acquiring 25% or more), a preliminary consent of the Russian government is needed 
(Idem). Furthermore, the law also knows a clause on ‘strategic deposits’: oil fields 
with recoverable reserves of over 70 million tonnes, gas fields with reserves over 50 
bcm and all offshore fields (Idem; King & Spalding, 2012). In these cases, foreign 
investors are even further restricted: subsoil licenses can only be held by Russian 
companies and in the case of offshore fields (such as for instance, nearly the entire 
Arctic), only by Russian companies that are at least 50% owned by the state and have 
no less than 5 years of experience in ‘developing Arctic shelf blocks in Russia’ 
(which essentially limits it to Rosneft and Gazprom) (King & Spalding, 2012). The 
implementation of this law has had clear consequences in the market, as the joint 
venture TNK-BP – which was 51% British-owned – was for instance forced to give 
up its majority share in the development of the Kovytka field (IHS Markit, 2010).  
  More recently, there has been some minor liberalization in the market: since 
2013, companies other than Gazprom are allowed to export LNG (Mitrova, 2013). 
However, as stated earlier, there is currently only one LNG terminal on stream (which 
is incidentally Gazprom controlled). Furthermore, only companies that hold subsoil 
licenses for strategic fields (which only Russian companies can hold) or are 50% 
state-owned have this privilege, which shows that the state is still keeping a tight 
control over exports (Baker McKenzie, 2017b).  
  Apart from bringing the gas industry back under state control, one could even 
make the argument that the continued use of long-term contracts with take-or-pay 
clauses are also a way to maintain a certain degree of mercantilist control over both 
the sector itself and the import partners. They ensure sales – and are thus a logical 																																																								
10 Rather, Gazprom shares can be acquired via ‘American Depository Receipts’: ‘instruments 
that carry the promise of exchange for normal Gazprom shares on a 1:10 basis’ (Victor & 
Victor, 2006).  
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choice from an economic standpoint – but also guarantee that the state has a say in 
how much gas is exported and where it is exported. In a more liberalized market, 
neither the state nor gas majors would have this choice.   
  That Putin, in turn, has used his tight control to directly influence Russia’s 
position vis a vis other nations – in true neorealist fashion – is for instance apparent 
from the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian energy crises. Although both of these disputes 
concerned gas pricing rather than a direct political disagreement, it is considered 
general knowledge that Gazprom’s demands were a reaction to Ukrainian’s 
increasingly Western political orientation (Stern, 2006; Newnham, 2011). By 
threatening with price increases, Russia ‘flexed its muscles’ towards Ukraine, 
underlining that gas can be used to exert power over other nations (Idem). The fact 
that gas prices were again lowered when Yanukovich – who was considered a pro-
Russian president – was in power, underlines that Russia is not afraid to use its gas for 
political purposes (Orttung & Overland, 2013). Moreover, the 2009 cut-off is also 
rumored to have been a ploy to garner European support for Nord Stream, again 
underlining how Russia can and does indeed influence other powers through its gas 
exports (Stegen, 2011). After all, Nord Stream was built despite initial resistance from 
the Baltic States and other EU Member States (Idem).  
  To conclude this section, we can state that the Russian gas export strategy 
under Putin is based on a mercantilist model driven by a neorealist foreign policy 
paradigm. Both his vocalization of the need to use Russia’s natural resource potential 
to maximize its power vis a vis other countries, as well as the policies implemented 
since 2003 clearly underline this. Moreover, as we see a stark contrast between the 
natural resource strategy in the 1990s – when Russia’s foreign policy paradigm leaned 
more towards liberalism – and the present, there is a strong case to make for the fact 
that Russia’s resource strategy is a direct consequence of its foreign policy approach. 
The gas crises in Ukraine furthermore underline that the ability to gain relative power 
through its gas exports is not only an abstract; this method has been used by Russia.  
  Now that we have established a clear view of the Russian resource base, 
infrastructure, market and strategy, we will move on to analyzing the potential effects 
the current changes in the global energy system will have on this industry. In the 
following section, we will go through each of the changes, highlighting why they are 
globally disruptive and analyzing their potential effects on the Russian gas export 
market and strategy.  
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IV. A Disrupted Market  
In this chapter, we will analyze the three most disruptive changes in the global energy 
system currently – the globalization of the gas market, the rise of RES and lower 
energy prices for longer – and their effect on Russia. We will go through each of these 
developments separately, first assessing why they are so disruptive, after which we 
will analyze the possible effects for the Russian gas export market and strategy.  
 
IV.i Globalization of the Gas Market 
The first change we will discuss in relation to the Russian gas market and strategy is 
the globalization of the gas market. Traditionally, the gas market has always been 
hampered by two main factors; it could only be conveniently transported through 
pipelines, and reserves were almost strictly confined to the strategic ellipse. This 
resulted in the establishment of an inherently rigid and regional market, with very 
limited options in terms of diversifying or in any way altering already established ties 
between producers and consumers. 
  Recent technological developments have opened the door to a more flexible 
and globalized gas market however. This is firstly due to the fact that LNG is 
becoming increasingly more popular and has shifted from being an expensive niche 
fuel to a mainstream way of sourcing gas. Since 2000, both the amount of LNG traded 
globally as well as the amount of countries importing LNG has more than doubled 
(IGU, 2017). Currently, there is 413.9 bcm of liquefaction capacity available 
worldwide, with another 155.8 bcm under construction as of January 2017 (Idem). On 
the other side of the spectrum, there is now 1,081.2 bcm of gasification capacity 
available 122.9 bcm underway as of Q1 2017 (Idem). Although still accounting for 
less than half the amount of globally traded pipeline-gas (346.6 bcm vs. 737.5), trade 
in LNG is currently growing seven times faster, indicating a growing importance of 
which the effects should not be underestimated (BP, 2017a, 2017b). Namely, as LNG 
can be transported by the same means as oil – per train or boat for instance – it frees 
consumers and producers from the binding ties of pipelines.  
  Secondly, hydraulic fracturing (better known as ‘fracking’ or ‘shale gas’) has 
made previously inaccessible gas reserves economically viable to develop. The 
greatest effect of this can be seen in the North American market, where both the US 
and Canada are producing shale gas in commercial quantities. Indeed, in the US the 
share of imported gas in general consumption dropped from 16.7% in 2007 to 2.8% in 
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2016 as a result of newly accessible domestic gas supplies (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2017). This, in turn, has triggered a global discussion on the potential of 
‘unconventional reserves’, as the US Energy Information Strategy estimates that shale 
gas reserves could amount up to 6,634 tcm, or 32% of the world’s total reserves (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013). Although development has been slow 
outside of North America – mostly due to environmental concerns – shale gas has 
created a paradigm shift in the thinking of importers, as it has created the potential for 
a decreased dependence on the strategic ellipse. 
  As these changes make both new sources and new markets accessible, it is 
generally expected that the gas market will become increasingly globalized in the 
future (Aune, Rosendahl & Sagen, 2009; Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2013). This, in turn, 
is associated with a myriad of different effects such as the eventual standardization of 
prices and a decrease of imports in countries with domestic unconventional resources 
(Aune et al., 2009; Medlock, Jaffe & O’Sullivan, 2014). Indeed, the United States is 
for instance set to become a net exporter of natural gas as of 2018, which is driven by 
its unconventional gas production and access to new markets (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2017). Most importantly to this thesis however is the fact 
that these developments create the option of diversification (Cohen, Joutz & Lougani, 
2011). This applies to both importers and exporters; as new markets and sources 
become available, the previously unchangeable dependencies no longer need to 
persist. Gas could, in theory, be traded from anywhere to anywhere in the future, 
which is a stark contrast from the traditional system.  
  So how does this affect the Russian market? As can be expected, the answer to 
this is not univocal. On the one hand, the option to diversify makes Russia’s biggest 
market, namely the EU, less dependent on its gas supplies. This is especially negative 
in the light of recent European legislation, which clearly indicates that there is a 
strong will to diversify away from Russian gas. On the other hand, LNG also presents 
Russia with the opportunity to diversify its exports destinations, indicating a 
potentially positive effect. Nevertheless, we will argue that significant changes will 
need to be made in its gas exporting strategy in order for Russia not to face significant 
difficulties as a result of the globalization of the gas market in the future.  
  In order to fully assess the (potential) effects of, we must first look at the 
situation on the EU market. As is well known, the EU is heavily dependent on 
Russian gas: at 106 bcm per annum, Russia currently accounts for 38.5% of all 
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natural gas imports, and 24.7% of total consumption (Eurostat, 2017; Statista, 2017). 
For countries in the (South-)East, this dependency is even higher, as they do not have 
access to alternative suppliers such as Norway (Luciani, 2016). Moreover, as 
domestic gas production is projected to decline sharply, the EU will become 
increasingly dependent on energy imports in the future, implicating a growing role for 
Russia if the status quo in terms of infrastructure is maintained (Idem). 
  That the strong dependence on Russia is considered a risk to European energy 
security is something that has often been vocalized by the EU leadership, especially 
since the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. Currently, enhancing the energy security through 
diversity of supply is a pillar of the EU Energy Strategy, with the urgency of 
diversifying away from Russia being continuously underlined by the leadership  
(European Commission, 2017a). As few other options are available to the EU, and the 
development of unconventional resources is unlikely due to lack of public support, 
LNG is a big part of this strategy (Luciani, 2016). Indeed, the current plan is to have a 
minimum of two potential sources of supply for every Member State, which can only 
be attained through an expansion of the LNG infrastructure (European Commission, 
2016a).  Hence there are currently seven LNG regasification terminals under 
construction or planned, which would increase the total regasification capacity to well 
over 225 bcm, which would be just short of covering the EU’s total gas imports of 
2016 (see Figure 5) (European Parliament, 2015; Eurostat, 2017).  
 
Figure 5. LNG Infrastructure in the EU, Source: European Commission (2016). 
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The EU’s eagerness to develop LNG infrastructure in order to diversify away 
from Russian gas is problematic for Russia in several ways. Firstly, and although 
there has been no discernible effect on Russia sales volumes yet, having more 
competitors on the European gas market is eventually projected to cut into the 
Russian market share and thus depress sales and income (European Commission, 
2016a; ERIRAS, 2016). More importantly however is the fact that the drive to 
diversify away from Russian gas is not motivated by market concerns, but rather by 
strategic considerations. This means that instead of only having to stay competitive 
and keep up a solid and reliable transit system, Russia would have to make far-
reaching changes in its strategy in order to maintain its market share and avoid a 
European switch to a more LNG-focused market.  
  Essentially, if the EU’s concern about its security of supply were price-driven, 
Russia would merely have to ensure the competitiveness of its gas prices vis a vis 
LNG. This should not prove insurmountable for Russia however, especially 
considering the fact that liquefaction and regasification of LNG is relatively costly at 
$4 to $5 whilst a strong pull from Asia has been racking up LNG prices globally 
(Luciani, 2017; Stern et al., 2014). Moreover, Europe would still have to make large 
and costly investments in infrastructure in order to refocus its dependency whilst 
continuously lower oil prices also mean lower prices for oil-indexed gas (see chapter 
IV.iii) (Idem). That this is however not the main concern is illustrated by for instance 
the (adopted) European Parliament (EP) motion ‘On an EU Strategy for Liquefied 
Natural Gas and Gas Storage’, which openly states LNG has historically always more 
expensive than pipeline gas, but still pledges for the switch strongly (European 
Parliament, 2016). A more concrete example of the fact that other concerns take 
precedence would be the construction of the Klaipeda LNG FSRU terminal in 
Lithuania. Since this has been taken into production, the gas prices here have only 
been about equal to those of Gazprom, whilst the building of the terminal cost $114 
million and its upkeep is $30 million yearly (Vaida, 2015; European Commission, 
2013). When these costs are added together, LNG thus costs unequivocally more than 
Russian pipeline gas. Despite the fact that LNG was never competitive here however, 
Klaipeda is considered as a good example of Europe’s diversification strategy and a 
model for other countries to such an extent that the European Commission provided 
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Lithuania with over $500 million in aid to finance its construction and upkeep (Idem).  
  Similarly, if the concerns were driven by the idea of supply disruptions due to 
external forces such as extreme weather conditions or problems in transit countries – 
not unimaginable considering the Ukrainian case – LNG would still not be the most 
attractive option. Indeed, it would then suffice to build a varied network of mostly 
direct pipelines, as was the idea behind Nord Stream, the plans for its extension and 
South Stream (Konoplyannik, 2014). Again however, the aforementioned motion 
shows that physical security of supply is not the primary concern. In example, the 
motion refers very specifically to the proposed doubling of the Nord Stream system 
and even though this would theoretically be the absolute safest option in terms of 
guaranteeing supplies of cheap natural gas in Northern Europe, the motion only 
covers potential downsides to the project (European Parliament, 2016). Indeed, the EP 
‘expresses concern at the proposed doubling of capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline, 
and the counterproductive effects this would have on energy security and 
diversification of supply sources and the principle of solidarity among Member 
States’, whilst it moreover ‘highlights the geopolitical implications of the project’ 
(Idem).11 Furthermore, it ‘underlines that a doubling of the capacity of the Nord 
Stream pipeline would give one company a dominant position on the European gas 
market, which should be avoided’ (Idem). Both this message and its wording 
(‘geopolitics implication’, ‘solidarity’) indicate considerations beyond the concrete 
concern for the safety of supply.  
  Indeed, rather than direct market concerns, it is the strategy behind Russia’s 
gas exports which worries the EU. Accordingly, it is said that the EU’s biggest issue 
regarding Russian gas imports is the fact that all imports are controlled by a single 
state-owned entity (Stern, Pirani & Yafimava, 2015). Due to the political connotations 
of the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian gas crises, there is a strong perception that the 
centralized management of the Russian gas export sector and the strong state 
involvement puts the EU at risk of disruptions as a result of political issues (Idem; 
Stegen, 2011). Moreover, the EU has generally been pursuing a strategy of far-
reaching liberalization in its gas market, indicating that Russia’s mercantilist approach 
inherently contradicts the European vision, even if it were to be political ally. 
  That the EU considers the Russian strategy unacceptable for its market is most 																																																								
11 Emphasis by author 
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strongly exemplified by the 2009 Third Energy Package. Instead of centralized 
control and strong companies, this Package consists of a set of directives and 
regulations specifically targeted at further liberalizing the European gas market and 
increasing competition (Yafimava, 2013). The most important measures in this regard 
are the fact that energy producers can no longer be involved in upstream development 
as well as transit operations (‘ownership unbundling’) and the fact that third-party 
access needs to be guaranteed in all transmission networks and storage facilities 
(European Commission, 2017b, 2017c). These rules are directly targeted towards big 
‘vertically-integrated’ gas companies like Gazprom and have had significant impact, 
mostly in relation to the tenability of Russia’s strategy. In example, as the Third 
Energy Package applies to all entities active in the EU, Gazprom was forced to sell 
off significant transmission assets in order not to be in violation; a clear case of forced 
liberalization and deviation from its usual strategy (Grigas, 2015; ERIRAS, 2016).  
  Moreover, third-party access has created uncertainty about the accessibility of 
pipeline capacity, as it has for instance kept Nord Stream from functioning at full 
capacity. Pipeline construction is associated with high capital investment, which in 
the Russian case is always in large part paid for by Gazprom, as was the case with 
Nord Stream. However, as third-party access needs to be guaranteed at 50% of the 
capacity (or 29 bcm) of the pipelines Nord Stream is connected to in the EU (OPAL 
and NEL), but the only connection to them is with Gazprom gas, Nord Stream 
(capacity: 55 bcm) can thus not function at capacity (Stern et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
the Nord Stream case is an excellent example of how the general tendency towards 
liberalization is exacerbated by the underlying political tensions in the Russian case 
specifically. Namely, the Third Energy Package allows for exemptions of the third-
party access rule in cases where it impedes on the supply security or puts future 
investment at risk, but it has proven impossible to get such an exemption in the case 
of Russian imports.  
  To illustrate: in 2016, Germany pushed for an exemption of the rule in the 
case of OPAL and NEL, (seemingly correctly) arguing it would enhance its security 
of supply (Euractiv, 2016). After the European Commission granted an initial 
exemption however, Poland put in a complaint against the decision at the EU Court of 
Justice, which subsequently led to its repeal in December 2016 (European 
Commission, 2016b; PGNiG, 2016). As the Polish complaint was generally seen as 
politically motivated, this is again a clear example of the fact that Russia needs to 
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consider more than just market forces when trying to maintain its position in the EU 
gas market. In fact, it indicates that the Russian model of building and financing big 
infrastructure (such as for instance South Stream or Nord Stream 2) in order to 
guarantee its sales to the EU would become a risky sales model if its mercantilist 
export strategy is maintained; without guaranteed access, it can never be ensured that 
it will get return on the investment. However, if Russia were to allow other companies 
to export pipeline gas, this problem would be mitigated; these new companies would 
then be the ‘third party’, whilst income would still flow to Russia. If Russia were to 
move towards this model – and many scholars expect that they will in the medium 
term – this would again be a clear case of forced liberalization, and thus shows the 
negative effect of the EU’s changing legislation on Russia’s preferred strategy (Stern 
et al., 2015; Stern et al., 2014; Özdemir & Karbuz, 2015).  
  To summarize, we can state that without a strategy change, the effect of the 
globalization of the gas market is unequivocally negative for the Russian gas export 
market and strategy in the EU. This is mainly due to the fact that this globalization 
allows the EU to diversify away from Russian gas through the means of increased 
LNG usage. Although we have seen that there are no market-based reasons that 
Russian gas should not be competitive vis a vis LNG, we have also assessed that the 
motivation of the EU goes beyond market principles. The main concern for the EU 
remains the fact that Russian gas exports are too centrally controlled, whilst the Union 
is consciously trying to limit the power of any single actor. The divergence between 
these two visions is furthermore exacerbated by the political tensions between the two 
blocs, ensuring that no exceptions will be made in granting Gazprom more access to 
the market for instance. Thus, the only realistic way for Russia to mitigate the risks of 
increased competition on the European gas market would be through a strategy 
change. Only if Russia were to switch to a more liberalized and less mercantilist 
export model can they be ensured of their future position in the EU market, which 
will otherwise seemingly gladly switch to more expensive LNG.  
  If for any reason Russia should refuse to change its strategy in Europe, the 
argument could be made that Russia could still benefit from the globalization of the 
gas market through its ability to reach new markets with LNG. This would mostly 
pertain to the Asian market, where gas demand is growing and especially Japan and 
China could be attractive markets for Russia. Japanese demand for LNG went up by 
10% (to 116 bcm) in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster and subsequent 
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nuclear shut down and although demand is expected to stabilize around 110 bcm in 
the coming years as nuclear power is phased back in, this is a steady LNG market 
(BP, 2017a; Rogers, 2016). A similar situation applies to China, where gas demand is 
projected to double over the next 15 years, from 192 bcm to 418 bcm according to the 
Chinese state oil major CNPC (Rogers, 2016). LNG imports in turn are set to account 
for at least 20% of its consumption (Idem). Moreover, as these markets are not 
dependent on Russia and are the political issues at play in the EU are absent, the 
Russian strategy should not present a significant problem here. Indeed, although 
diversification is also a main pillar in the Japanese energy strategy, it currently 
imports 60% of its LNG from Malaysia, Australia and Qatar so Russia could actually 
be a country to diversify towards rather than away from (Enecho, 2016; Motomura, 
2014). In the Chinese case, a big share of domestic unconventional production 
combined with a more varied sources of pipeline gas (China currently already imports 
from Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) makes that no single 
exporter could take a dominant position, negating the potential risks that apply in the 
EU (Rogers, 2016; BP, 2017).  
  However, although Russia’s strategy would most likely not be negatively 
affected by the globalization of the gas market when we look at the Asian side, the 
speed of the current change might make it difficult to find an upside for the concrete 
market. Namely, whilst Russia only has one LNG terminal currently on stream, Qatar 
and Australia have already cornered 50% of the Asian-Pacific gas market, whilst they 
account for over 35% of global liquefaction capacity (IGU, 2017; BP, 2017). In 2018, 
Australia is furthermore expected to overtake Qatar as the world’s largest LNG 
exporter (Luciani, 2016). Although this need not ‘kill Russia in the crib’ necessarily, 
it does show that if Russia does not develop further LNG export capacity with some 
urgency, it might fall behind and find a fully established market already in place by 
the time it is capable of significantly increasing its exports (Henderson, 2017). This is 
enhanced by the fact that the only other LNG facility set to come on stream in the 
short term (Yamal LNG) cannot realistically serve the Asian market due to its 
geographical location. Moreover, even though this market is less politicized and 
strategy-based, there is the salient detail of the fact that Russia has already liberalized 
its LNG exports to a certain extent (Mitrova, 2013). This implies that the Russian 
leadership is well aware of the fact that in order to increase LNG export capacity in 
the short-term, it will have to loosen its control over the market, reinforcing what we 
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assessed before. Namely, that the only way Russia can maintain its position as a 
dominant exporter in a globalizing gas market is by altering its strategy.  
  In conclusion of this section, we must assess that the globalization of the gas 
market presents a formidable challenge to Russia’s gas export market and strategy. 
Especially in the European case, where the option to diversify through LNG is slowly 
enabling the EU to move away from Russian gas, it is clear that without far-reaching 
changes to its strategy, Russia will eventually lose market share. The motivation 
behind the EU’s diversification strategies, which is primarily strategic and based on 
curtailing the influence of individual actors, means that even when Russian gas would 
remain competitive and it could guarantee direct and uninterrupted supplies, its 
market share would still suffer without changing its strategy. In the Asian case, the 
situation is quite different, but here the globalization might negatively impact 
Russia’s gas export market potential as its LNG development is lagging behind on 
other major exports. Moreover, the slight liberalization of the LNG market shows that 
the Russian leadership acknowledges that its mercantilist, highly controlling strategy 
might not be beneficial to its market share here either. In conclusion, although this is 
of course a long-term projection, it seems that the in order to mitigate the otherwise 
negative effects on the Russian gas export market, the globalization of the gas market 
will force Russia towards a more liberal and less mercantilist gas export strategy.    
   
IV.ii The Rise of Renewable Energy Sources 
The second change we will discuss is the rise of RES. The recent increase in RES 
usage in undoubtedly one of the most disruptive developments the global energy 
system has seen in many decades. Since the dawn of the modern age, the world has 
been powered by fossil fuels. From the coalmines of Industrial Revolution-era 
England to state of the art oil-facilities in Saudi Arabia today, fossil fuels have 
continuously shaped our energy landscape over the last two hundred years. 
Increasingly however, governments are realizing that the status quo in energy is no 
longer sustainable and that the price to pay for a fossil fuel-based system is too high. 
From the historic climate change deal made during the COP 21 in Paris and the 
ambitious goals set by the EU, China and others, the global energy landscape is now 
slowly moving away from its traditional staples.  
  This awareness and the magnitude of the impact of RES on the global energy 
system are clearly illustrated by the recent growth in global capacity. Since 2007, 
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RES capacity has more than doubled, from 989 213 Megawatt (MW) to 2 006 202 
MW in 2016, or approximately 13% of the global energy supply (IRENA, 2017; 
OECD Data, 2017). Most of this growth comes from ‘modern renewables’ (i.e. wind 
and solar), which have consistently grown at twice the rate of global energy demand 
(REN 21, 2017).  
  Another element reinforcing this trend – whilst also showing it is not a 
temporary phenomenon – is the fact that nearly all countries currently have a pledged 
commitment to increasing the share of RES in their energy mix or at least decrease 
the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which is essentially impossible 
without RES. In example, 148 out of the 197 signatories have now ratified the 
aforementioned Paris agreement, which aims to keep the global temperature rise 
below 2 degrees Celsius and ‘to reach global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as 
possible’ (UNFCCC, 2017a, 2017b). Moreover, in the last three years, over 160 
countries have made specific commitments to implement more clean energy (i.e. 
RES) (Ross, 2016). 
  Some of the most important actors in regards to the global transition to a more 
RES-focused system are incidentally also Russia’s biggest (future) gas export 
partners: China, the EU, and Germany in particular. Together, these countries account 
for almost half of global RES capacity (REN 21, 2017). Moreover, their pledges 
regarding RES are some of the most far reaching. The EU aims at an RES share in its 
gross final energy consumption of 27% in 2030 and 55% in 2050, whilst China 
pledged a share of 20% by 2030 (which is affirmed in its 13th Five-Year-Plan) 
(Xinhuanet, 2015; European Commission, 2017a; European Commission, 2011). 
Meanwhile, Germany – Russia’s biggest gas export market – is in a league of its own. 
In 2010, its government announced a strategy for a full-blown transition to a more 
sustainable energy system – also known as the Energiewende – and as a part of this it 
pledged a share of RES of 30% in 2030 and 60% in 2050 (BMWi, 2010).  
  That these pledges cannot be ignored when assessing the future energy market 
becomes apparent when you look at the current status of RES in these markets. As of 
2015, RES accounts for circa 12,5% of the EU’s gross inland consumption (a 179% 
growth since 1990), with a similar number for Germany (representing an astounding 
751% of growth since 1990) (AG Energiebilanz, 2016; Eurostat, 2016a, 2016b). In 
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China, no separate data on the exact share of RES is available12, but as energy 
consumption growth slows down and RES capacity grows, some observers are 
projecting a 17% share in 2020 (China Statistics Press, 2016; Myllyvirta, 2017). 
Indeed, in 2015, China’s added RES capacity was the same as Germany’s total 
generating capacity whilst energy consumption only grew with 0.9% (China 
Statistics, 2016; Göss, 2017).  
  With this size and growth rate, it should be evident that the rise of RES is 
indeed fundamentally changing the global energy balance and will inevitably impact 
the fossil fuel sector as well. This leads us to the question: ‘Which effect will it have 
on Russian gas exports?’ As we have assessed, Russia’s main export markets are on 
the forefront of RES usage and as such, we can expect to find significant effects. 
Moreover, RES and gas are direct competitors – both are primarily used in electricity 
generation – compounding the possible impact on Russia as a gas exporter. 
   To answer our question, we will highlight one case: Germany. This is firstly 
because as of now, there are no gas exports to China yet and thus no effect can be 
discernible. Secondly, to analyze the data of every EU 28 member is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Thirdly, at 46 bcm in 2016, Germany is by far Russia’s biggest 
gas importer, increasing the relevance of any changes (BP, 2017a). However, as the 
characteristics of gas and RES do not differ from case to case and, it should be kept in 
mind that although we underline this one case, our findings should be considered 
equally applicable to other Russian gas export markets (including, in the future, 
China). 
  In theory, the effects of increased RES usage on gas consumption need not be 
negative at all. Quite the contrary actually: even though they are direct competitors in 
the electricity sector, they also have a complimentary function. This is due to two 
reasons: firstly, RES needs a back-up fuel to allow for inevitable fluctuations in 
production and secondly, gas is the most flexible and cleanest fossil fuel.  
  When an electricity system is based on conventional power sources, demand is 
covered by a ‘base load’, which can be supplemented with an ‘intermediate load’ and 
‘peak load’ in moments that the demand exceeds the base load (for instance during 
dinner time or in the morning) (see Figure 6).  This base load is usually accounted for 																																																								
12 In Chinese government statistics, renewables energy is grouped under the general 
denominator ‘primary electricity and other energy’, which accounted for 12% of consumption 
in 2016 (China Statistics Press, 2016).   
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by nuclear or coal-fired power plants. These types of plants are used because they can 
provide cheap and consistent power in large amounts. However, they cannot be 
ramped up or down efficiently; it takes a long time to turn them on and off and. Thus, 
sudden surges in demand are usually covered by gas or other more flexible power 
sources such as large hydro-plants (Institute for Energy Research, 2014). Keeping this 
balance is crucial to the health of the system, as too much power on the grid at once 
would cause an overload, which can lead to faltering or even a shut down of the 
transmission network. Moreover, it could lead to negative prices for energy, which is 
not a healthy economic precedent to set. 
 
 
When RES come into play however, such a base load suddenly becomes detrimental 
to the health of the system. RES output is inherently variable; the sun and the wind do 
not function according to power demand. Thus, in a system with a large share of RES, 
it impossible to predict the amount of base load needed over a longer period of time. 
The continued use of a base load would then put the system at risk of overloading, as 
high RES output would cut into the base demand. That such a scenario is not merely 
theory can be illustrated by a recent event in Germany. On April 30th, 2017, which 
was an unexpectedly warm day, Germany managed to cover a record 85% of its 
electricity usage with RES (Hanley, 2017). This kind of RES output would have 
surely caused an overload if had Germany relied on a big base load. 
  Rather than a base load, RES needs ‘flexible back-up’: the back-up of an 
additional power source that can be turned off an on with relative ease and speed to 
compensate for unexpected surges and shortfalls in RES production. It is here that 
natural gas comes in as gas turbines can achieve 100% capacity within 10 to 30 
Figure 6. Example of an 
electricity supply based on 
conventional sources. 
Source: Institute for Energy 
Research (2014).
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minutes, depending on whether it is a combined (30 minutes) or simple cycle (10 
minutes) turbine (Balling, Lothar & Siemens, 2010; Institute for Energy Research, 
2014).  
  Of course, there are other sources of power that could be used as a flexible 
back up. The most logical of these would be oil, as it is already commonly used for 
the peak load in conventional systems. However, as natural gas emits 28% less CO2 
per unit burnt, and even 45% less than the most commonly used coal (lignite), it 
would be assumed to be the perfect complimentary fuel to RES (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2017). Thus, when for instance Germany launched their 
Energiewende project, many observers expected a rise in natural gas consumption 
together with RES (Agora Energiewende, 2014). 
  This is not to say that the potential effects can only be positive. Although gas 
is for instance a much more appropriate backup fuel, it is also considerably more 
expensive than coal, especially at times of high oil prices and thus higher gas prices. 
Moreover, RES usage is rarely an isolated event; pledges often include both a RES 
commitment as well as commitments to energy efficiency, which lead to decreased 
energy consumption and thus narrow the market for gas. 
  When we look at Russian gas exports to Germany, the duality of the 
relationship between gas and RES becomes clearly visible. Indeed, although Russia 
gas exports to Germany did not suffer under the implementation of more RES, the 
positive effects that were projected also did not materialize. Moreover, in order to 
keep its market share up, Russia was forced to alter its strategy towards Germany, 
indicating that in its current form, the rise of RES is disadvantageous to the Russian 
market and strategy.  
  The implementation of the Energiewende in 2011 and the subsequent upswing 
in RES usage had surprisingly mild effects on the German gas market. However, mild 
though they might be, also some of these smaller changes are actually very revealing 
as to the future potential for gas in an RES-driven system. Firstly, it is clear from 
Figure 7 that the expectation of significant growth in gas consumption was false. 
Although the market has developed somewhat haphazardly and gas is currently in an 
upswing again, absolute consumption (80.5 bcm) is still considerably lower than for 
instance in pre-Energiewende 2010 (84.1 bcm) (BP, 2017a). Moreover the current 
upswing – a growth of nearly 10% compared to last year – coincides strongly with a 
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lower price for oil-indexed gas, implying this might be due to price elasticity of 
demand rather than a renewed impetus for the role of gas on RES-heavy markets. 
 
 
 
That the potential positive effects did not materialize as theorized is even clearer 
when we look at the electricity sector. Here, the share of gas fell from 14.1% of all 
electricity generation in 2010 to 9.6% in 2015 (AG Energiebilanz, 2016). Again, we 
see a slight upswing currently, with preliminary reports projecting a share of 12% in 
2016 (AG Energiebilanz, 2017a). However, although this might be the start of a 
positive trend, the absolute share of gas is still considerably lower in the electricity 
sector than it was pre-Energiewende. As most energy efficiency policies focus on the 
electricity sector as well, a small decrease in gas’ share already translates to big 
absolute numbers; it simply takes less to make up a 10% share. Hence, although the 
difference in gas’ share in the electricity mix between 2010 and 2016 would be a mere 
-2.1%, gross electricity (i.e. absolute) production from gas dropped by 18%; from 
86.67 Terra Watt hours (TWh) to 71.3 TWh (Idem). 
  
Figure 7. Gas Consumption in 
Germany (bcm) and Share of 
TPES (%), Source: BP (2017); 
AG Energiebilanz (2016), 
(2017b); graph by author. 
Figure 8. Russian Gas 
Exports to Germany (bcm), 
Source: BP (2017), (2016), 
(2015), (2014), (2013), 
(2012), (2011); graph by 
author.  
	 A Brave New World: Russian Gas Exports in a Changing Global Market 	
	 42 
Somewhat surprisingly, and despite the ambiguous performance of gas since 
Germany’s RES boom, Russia imports have actually not been suffering. As can be 
seen in Figure 8, Russian imports decreased somewhat directly after the 
implementation of the Energiewende, but have since rebounded. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that the changes in Germany have not had any impact on the Russia 
gas export market or strategy. Indeed, the German case underlines how precarious the 
situation for Russia in a more RES driven market is. There are three main reasons for 
this: energy efficiency, the relatively low competitiveness of gas as a fuel and, most 
importantly, the structure of Russian gas contracts. 
  Firstly, the impact that energy efficiency has had on gas’ share of the gross 
electricity production of Germany should be considered a warning sign. Although not 
directly related to the rise of RES, all actors with strong RES pledges have a similarly 
strong commitment to decreasing their overall energy usage (or stalling its growth, as 
is the case in China). As energy efficiency measures are mostly applied in the same 
sectors as gas however –most importantly, the electricity sector – this means that this 
could hit gas disproportionately hard. Considering the pledges of the EU, Germany 
and China, we can thus assess that this secondary effect of the rise of RES usage and 
increased awareness about sustainability could still prove detrimental to Russia in the 
long term.  
  Secondly, the fact that gas usage initially decreased after the implementation 
of the Energiewende and did not bounce back until after prices had dropped 
(indicating a certain elasticity of demand), warrants some worry about the 
competitiveness of gas. Indeed, as long as there are cheaper substitutes such as coal 
available, it is difficult for gas to stay competitive as a back-up fuel. The initial drop 
in gas usage in Germany after 2011 is often attributed to the ‘coal conundrum’; as oil-
indexed gas prices kept rising, coal became more attractive as a back up fuel, despite 
Germany’s dedication to sustainability. Now that oil prices are low with gas prices 
following suit, this problem is temporary abated. However, as long as Russia holds on 
to oil-indexed pricing, it is bound to encounter this problem again in the future. This 
applies to the EU 28, where coal is widely available and the access to LNG (the prices 
of which are generally ‘spot-based’, i.e. decided by the market) is growing, but even 
more so for China. Considering the distance the gas must travel to reach market – 
making it inherently less competitive –, and the wide availability of very cheap coal 
there, Russia would do well to try to ensure the competitiveness of its gas in that 
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market by looking at other options than oil-indexation.  
  This brings us to the last, and most important, reason why Russia cannot be 
assured of its position in energy systems with a high share of RES: Russia’s gas 
contract structure. Russia’s determination to continue its gas trade on the basis of 
long-term gas contracts with oil-indexed prices and take-or-pay clauses is problematic 
in relation to RES for one important reason: it defeats the purpose of gas as a flexible 
fuel. As we have already assessed, it is difficult to assess the power demand that RES 
can or cannot cover on a certain point in time. Hence, if a consumer is forced to buy a 
pre-set amount of gas on a pre-set time at a pre-set price, the possibility arises that this 
gas is either not needed (which, considering the take-or-pay clauses, would create the 
need for significant, and costly, storage capacity) or that is does not cover base 
demand.  
  In fact, this incompatibility between Russia’s preferred contract structure and 
more RES usage has already led to a new precedent in Germany, set by two of its 
energy majors: E.On and RWE. The decrease in demand combined with the high 
prices of gas in the early years of the Energiewende prompted these companies to file 
arbitration again their contracts with Gazprom, claiming that long-term natural gas 
contracts and oil-indexed prices were no longer a feasible business model in the 
newly structured market (Reuters, 2011, 2013).  
  E.On was the first to make a case against its long-term contract with Gazprom 
(which runs until 2036 and covers 600 bcm) and a settlement was reached in July 
2012 (E.On, 2012). This entailed a retroactive revision of the price from Q4 2010 
onwards and steadied E.On’s economic outlook, as can be seen in Figure 9 (Idem). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Net Income E.On & 
RWE (€ in millions), Source: E.On 
(2011); (2013); (2015); (2016a)*; 
RWE (2011); (2013a); (2015); 
(2016)**; graph by author. 
 
* E.On separated its conventional energy 
generations into a new holding  (Uniper) as 
per January 1st, 2016 but retained its (gas) 
retail operations) 
** RWE separated its renewable energy 
generation, power grid and retail 
operations into a new holding (Innogy SE) 
as per April 1st, 2016.  
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In 2013, after booking a hefty loss in 2012-2013, RWE followed suit and filed a claim 
at the Vienna Court of Arbitration to have the price as well as the pricing-mechanism 
of its long-term contracts revised. RWE won the case and was rewarded a price 
revision backdated to Q2 2010 as well as a revision of the pricing-mechanism to 
include a bigger share of gas-to-gas indexation (RWE, 2013b). This was the first 
instance that Russia’s preferred pricing mechanism for gas (based on oil prices) was 
changed due to external pressure (Andresen, 2013). As can be seen in Figure 9, there 
was a direct positive effect visible in RWE’s economic outlook.  
  E.On filed suit again in 2016, claiming that even with the effect of a lower oil 
price, in order to hedge its future economic viability, further changes were needed. It 
was again rewarded damages, including further price revisions and back-payments 
(Reuters, 2016; E.On, 2016b).13 
  In short, these court cases show us that even though Russia managed to 
maintain its market share in Germany, it could not do so without altering its usual 
strategy. The urgency to do so is underlined by the other problems we highlighted. As 
the projected golden future of gas and RES did not materialize and energy efficiency 
is actually (slowly) narrowing the market for gas, it is crucial that gas remain 
competitive vis a vis other possible back-up fuels. With its long-term contracts, take-
or-pay clauses and oil-indexed prices, this is becoming increasingly hard for Russia.  
  To conclude this section, we can state that the effect of RES on Russia’s gas 
market and strategy is twofold. One the one hand, it need not impact exports 
negatively as gas and RES are at no point mutually exclusive. On the other hand 
however, we see that the positive developments as they might have been expected 
have not materialized either. This is mostly due to the contractual structure Gazprom 
abides by: through this, Russia negates the advantage of gas’ flexibility. That the 
effect of this is considerable is shown by the court cases between E.On, RWE and 
Gazprom; these forced a part of the control over the exports out of Gazprom’s – and 
by proxy the Russian state’s – hands. This indicates that the effect of increased RES 
usage on Russia’s strategy is much bigger than the effect on the market as such. 
Similar to the effects of the globalization of gas, we see here that in order to maintain 
its position, Russia will have to let go some control (i.e. move away from its 
mercantilist modus operandi) in order to establish a model that is more beneficial to 																																																								
13 The exact specifications of the settlement were not published, but E.On announced that is 
would have a positive effect on its cash flow to the amount of €800 million (E.On, 2016b).  
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its consumers as well. This would indicate a forced turn to a more liberalist 
worldview; one based on mutual benefits as opposed to zero-sum gains.   
 
IV.iii Lower Prices for Longer 
The last global development we will discuss in relation to the Russian gas export 
market and strategy is the continuously lower oil – and in the case of oil-indexation – 
gas price, for which Goldman Sachs coined the phrase ‘lower for longer’ in 2015 
(Goldman Sachs, 2015).  After the oil price rebounded from the 2008 financial crash, 
when it dropped from a historical $148 per barrel (bbl) to under $40/bbl, the price of 
both Brent (used for the European basin) and WTI (used for the North American 
basin) stabilized between $75 and $100/bbl (World Economic Forum, 2016). In June 
2014 however, another drop set in and prices recalibrated between $40 and $60, with 
the beginning of 2016 as an outlier with prices as low as $28/bbl (see Figures 10 and 
11) (Bloomberg, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
The cause of this relative drop is relatively simple: there is a glut in the market 
(World Economic Forum, 2016). Where the 2008 drop was almost entirely caused by 
Figure 10. & 11. 
Prices of Brent 
crude & WTI 
crude (in $ of last 
five years), 
Source: 
Bloomberg 
(2017a). 
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a drop in demand, both record production and lowered demand are currently putting 
pressure on the oil price (World Bank Group, 2016). On the production side, the 
biggest causes are US shale oil production and record outputs in Canada and Russia 
and Iran. In the US, the development of the shale oil industry has significantly 
decreased its import dependency, whilst in 2016, it was the biggest oil producer 
globally at 12354 thousand barrels per day (kbpd) (BP, 2017). Between 2010 and 
May 2017, its net imports have dropped from 9,441 to 4,47414 kpbd (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2017). Secondly, Canada and Russia are both producing 
at record levels, having reached a 2016 average of 4460 kbpd and 11227 kbpd 
respectively (Idem).  Moreover, the lifting of the Iranian sanctions in 2015 has 
reinvigorated production there, which grew by 18% between 2015 and 2016, reaching 
an average of 4600 kbpd (Idem). 
  Moreover, as of now there is no indication that this oversupply will decrease 
soon. This is mainly because the decentralization of oil production due to the 
development of unconventional resources such as shale oil (mainly in the US) and tar 
sands (mainly in Canada) has decreased the ability of traditional ‘oil arbiter’ OPEC to 
control prices. Hence, despite the fact that after 18 months of overproduction, OPEC 
finally agreed on production cuts in order to push the price back up in December 
2016, prices barely reacted (Bloomberg, 2017; Wingfield & Dodge, 2017). This deal 
entailed a reduction of global production by 1.8 million barrels per day and was 
signed by all OPEC members bar Libya and Syria, as well as 11 non-OPEC members, 
including Russia and Kazakhstan (Wingfield & Dodge, 2017). However, in addition 
to the fact that major players such as the US and Canada were not included and did 
not curb production either, many of the signatories to the deal did not cut production 
sufficiently (Idem; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). Indeed, from the 
bigger producers, neither Russia nor Iraq decreased managed the proposed cuts, 
whilst Kazakhstan actually increased its production (Wingfield & Dodge, 2017). 
Furthermore, as the US shale oil industry is notoriously fast in scaling production up 
or down, we have seen a pattern evolve in which the slightest rise in prices 
immediately increases US domestic production, which in turn depresses the price 
again (Cunningham, 2017). These developments are not only indicative of a major 
change on the oil market (i.e. less power for OPEC) but also of the fact that the supply 																																																								
14 5 month average.  
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glut will not be easily fixed; without a group arbiter, all producers will want to protect 
their market share and maximize their profits at a low price, rather than curb 
production in an attempt to increase prices and run the risk of being overtaken by 
other producers (World Bank Group, 2016). 
  On the demand side, there is also little indication of the fact that a quick fix is 
possible. The drop in demand (growth) is mostly coming from China, Japan and 
Europe. In the Chinese case, the slowdown of economic growth led to a decrease in 
oil demand growth, which was further exacerbated by the fact that its oil storage 
facilities reached near capacity in mid-2016, further decreasing its demand (World 
Economic Forum, 2016; Bloomberg, 2016). In Japan, the energy consumption has 
been decreasing for four years in a row, whilst the initial upswing in oil consumption 
after the 2011 nuclear stop has evaporated with the return to nuclear power (Rogers, 
2016). Lastly, in Europe demand hit an all time low in 2015 amidst slow economic 
growth, an upswing in biofuel usage and increasingly successful energy efficiency 
policies (Eurostat, 2016c; World Economic Forum, 2016; World Bank Group, 2016). 
All in all, these are not issues that will quickly be dissolved. The economic outlook 
for all three powers is relatively bleak: Chinese economic growth is projected to 
decrease progressively hereafter whilst Japan and Europe will continue to feel the 
pressure of its aging populations and slow growth rate (OECD, 2014). Moreover, 
Japan is set to reintroduce most of its nuclear capacity over the next few years, whilst 
also implementing stringent energy efficiency measures (Rogers, 2016). Similarly, the 
previously discussed energy efficiency measures in the EU will also certainly have an 
effect on oil demand (European Commission, 2017a).  
  Now that we have assessed the extent of the current oil price glut, we arrive at 
the question of what effect it has on the Russian gas export market and strategy. In 
short, we can divide this into two major effects: a decrease of the gas export price and 
a lack of revenue to invest in upstream development. Although the subsequent 
consequences of these effects might seem inherently negative, we will show that the 
reality is actually quite complex. Firstly, lower gas export prices actually lean towards 
a positive effect for both the market and strategy. The lack of revenue, in turn, will 
present Russia with great difficulties as it prohibits domestic financing of investment, 
but its effects are trumped by the effect of the sanctions regime, which actually 
enhances the Russian mercantilist strategy, even though the market will inherently 
suffer.  
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  As we discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of Russian gas exports 
are still based on long-term contracts with oil-indexed prices which means that the 
recent downturn in oil prices has also caused a significant decrease in Russian gas 
export prices. To illustrate, the average German import price came down to around $5 
per million British thermal units (mmBtu15) in 2016 from almost $10/mmBtu in 2014 
(BP, 2017). This has had two discernible results for the Russian gas market and 
strategy, both of which are relatively positive. Firstly, there is a correlation between 
the drop in prices and increased exports. In the aforementioned German case this 
resulted in a +7.5 bcm change between 2014 and 2016 (Idem; BP, 2015). This 
correlation is confirmed when we look at Russia’s total exports to Europe, which are 
up by 18.3 bcm since the oil price crash (Idem). Clearly, there are many factors at 
play here, and assuming that it is anything more than a correlation would be to forgo 
on the political and strategic elements of the gas market. Indeed, in chapter IV.i we 
assessed that price-levels are not the EU’s first concern when it comes to its imports 
from Russia. In the long term, it will be more than low prices that decide Russia’s fate 
in the EU gas market. Nevertheless, it does seem that as long as it is able to maintain 
these highly competitive prices – which, considering the intensity of the current oil 
glut, might be for quite some time – it will be somewhat easier for Russia to maintain 
its market share vis a vis still relatively expensive LNG supplies (especially when one 
considers the relatively higher added cost of LNG infrastructure construction per 
purchased mmBtu now) (Rogers, 2015). Thus, and although only a strategy change 
could truly solidify its position, lower prices might actually prove to be mildly 
positive for the Russian gas market in the medium term. 
  Secondly, lower prices due to oil-indexation could enhance Russia’s strategy 
in terms of maintaining its preferred contractual structure. As we assessed in section 
IV.ii, there was a lot of protest against these expensive and inflexible long-term gas 
contracts when the oil price was high. Although lower prices do not compensate for 
all the disadvantages of these contracts (mostly in regards to their inflexibility), it is 
considered by some that lower prices will curb the enthusiasm of importers to further 
decouple gas prices from oil (Marten & Jimenez, 2015). Indeed, as long as oil prices 
remain low, consumers are guaranteed lower gas prices if they remain working on the 																																																								
15 A British thermal unit are a traditional measure of heat intensity that is defined by the 
amount of energy needed to heat one pound of water by one degree Fahrenheit and which is 
commonly used in gas pricing. 	
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base of oil-indexation. Again, this effect can only be deemed mildly positive as the 
Russian contractual strategy knows more pressure points and there is no indication 
that gas-to-gas hub pricing – although more expensive currently – is inherently more 
expensive than oil-indexed pricing.  
  Despite the relatively positive consequences for the Russian gas market and 
strategy described above, there is another important effect to be taken into account: a 
lower oil price – and subsequently lower gas prices – result in less income for the 
Russian state. As already assessed, the Russian state relies heavily on the income of 
fossil fuel exports. However, natural gas revenues have been decreasing steadily since 
the crash of the oil price: from $59.9 billion (or 22.3% of the budget) in 2014 to $30.6 
billion (or 6.7% of the budget) in 2016  (Simola & Solanko, 2017). Although Russia 
might be able to withstand a $29.3 billion drop in revenue, when we consider the 
corresponding losses in revenue from oil exports (from $131.7 billion in 2014 to 
$52.1 billion in 2016) it should become clear that the effect of lower fossil fuel prices 
is a major concern to Russia. 
  When we look at the drop in revenue in relation to the gas market and 
strategy, there is one thing that stands out: it has decreased the capacity to make 
upstream investments. Although this applies to all producers of course, it is especially 
challenging to Russia due to three reasons. Firstly, and as we assessed before, the 
fields Russia is currently producing from are depleting. Secondly, the majority of its 
fresh reserves are either still complete virgin fields or located in the Arctic Circle, 
which are both very costly to develop. Lastly, Russia is currently under sanctions, 
strongly limiting their ability to attract foreign funds.  
  Although neither the exact depletion rate of the currently active fields nor the 
total amount of investment needed to develop its new reserves are public knowledge, 
it is generally assumed that Russia will need serious upstream investment soon in 
order to ensure sufficient exporting supplies (Boon von Ochsée, 2010; Konoplyanik, 
2012; Stern, 2005). Before the decrease in revenue from fossil fuel exports, this 
would not have been a significant challenge. As it has done historically, investments 
could have been sourced domestically, whilst any required technology would have 
been readily available from the West at a certain price (Smeenk, 2010). Furthermore, 
if Russia had not been under sanctions, even a strong decrease of revenue might have 
been compensable; it would have just had to attract investment from abroad. In fact, 
in that case the argument could have been made that a decrease in revenue need not 
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impact the market per se but might have only had a significant impact on the Russian 
strategy. Indeed, conform Putin’s thesis, the question would then have been whether 
Russia was too mercantilist and guaranteed too few ownership rights to attract foreign 
investment (Balzer, 2005; Olcott, 2004). Our conclusion in that case might have been 
similar to that of the previous two chapters: this change need not necessarily be 
negative to the Russian market, lest it alter its strategy in order to accommodate for 
the Western liberal paradigm better.  However, the situation under the sanctions 
regime has altered the above scenario significantly. In fact, the situation has been 
reversed: instead of negative effects mostly pertaining to its strategy, they now pertain 
mostly to the market itself, whilst the strategy can remain unaltered.  
  When we look at the future of the Russian gas market in the light of dropping 
revenues and Western sanctions, we see quite a bleak picture. Firstly, the current 
sanction regime states that Western entities can ‘no longer buy or sell new bonds, 
equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days’, from – 
amongst other actors – any of the three major energy companies in Russia (Gazprom, 
Rosneft and Novatek), whilst loans can also not exceed a 30-day duration (European 
Union Newsroom, 2017). This has greatly exacerbated the negative effects of the 
current drop in revenues, as Russia can now neither raise such funds domestically nor 
source funds from abroad. This is further aggravated by the fact that between their 
own sluggish growth and the fact that it mostly concerns the development of fields 
destined for Western markets, Russia’s Asian partners (i.e. China) have not been 
eager to invest in Russian upstream development either (De Jong, 2016). Moreover, 
even if Russia was able to gather funds for upstream development, the export of 
offshore technology or any technology designed for use in the Arctic is also 
sanctioned by the West, whilst there is no other partner that has access to this type of 
technology (Kuersten, 2015). When all put together, the subsequent inability to 
develop new fields as planned could lead to a ‘generation of lost exploration’, as a 
lack of development could lead to shortages in supplies in the future (Gurvich, 2015; 
Henderson & Grushevenko, 2017).  
  When it comes to Russia’s strategy however, the combination of low fossil 
fuel revenue and sanctions has quite a different effect. As stated, it is a safe 
assumption that if Russia had not been under sanction, Western involvement in terms 
of investment would have been strong in the light of diminished fossil fuel revenue. 
As Western companies are no longer allowed to be involved in upstream development 
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in any meaningful way however, the associated effect of their involvement – such as 
demands on the guarantee of ownership and general hostility towards Russia’s 
mercantilist policies – are no longer a concern. In fact, if Russia would be able to 
develop its new fields without Western involvement, it domestic strategy could 
remain unaltered indefinitely.  In short, if one would only consider the strategic side 
of the matter, the negative effects of a decrease in revenue have actually been 
mitigated by the sanctions. Namely, as the increased dependency on Western partners 
that would otherwise have been expected could never materialize, Russia is still free 
to manage the development of its domestic market at will. The fact that the state is 
now supporting state-owned companies more openly than ever in terms of 
incentivizing the development of previously inaccessible reserves – such as Russian 
shale gas and oil wells in the Far North – underlines that the leadership appreciates 
the value of this idea (Financial Times, 2017b; Henderson & Grushevenko, 2017). 
However, one must also consider that despite Russia’s best efforts, the market it now 
freely presides over will continuously be at great risk of stagnation without Western 
investments and technology, which might be considered less desirable than a strategy 
change.  
  The theoretical connotations of this change are more difficult to identify, as 
there is no directly discernible effect on the Russian strategy. On a more abstract and 
negative note however, one might argue that Russia is only in the current situation 
because it maintains a neorealist perspective of the world. After all, the sanctions are 
a result of Russia’s actions against Ukraine, which were most certainly motivated by a 
desire to gain relative power against the West. In that case, the bleak outlook for its 
market could have been avoided if Russia had switched to a more liberal (and, in 
relation to the gas market, less mercantilist) strategy earlier, which would underline 
our previous assessments: in order for Russia to have a prosperous gas market, it must 
move towards liberalism.  
  In conclusion of this section, we can state that the effect of ‘lower for longer’ 
is especially confounding in the Russian case. Especially in combination with the 
sanctions, it enhances the Russian strategy whilst the effect on its market is less 
negative than might have been assumed. However, in both cases the positive effects 
are to be taken with a grain of salt. Whilst the drop in prices has made both Russian 
gas and its contractual structure more attractive – surely a positive effect on both the 
market and strategy – we must not overlook the fact that there are many other 
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considerations to the European gas import model than pricing. These, in turn, are sure 
to outweigh this initial advantage in time if Russia would not change its strategy. 
Moreover, whilst the fact that the West could not step in in order to support Russian 
energy development in the light of lower prices might be a positive in terms of not 
affecting the Russian strategy in any way (no Western involvement means a free 
reign), the dangers of decreased funds and potential future shortages outweigh this 
whilst also indicating that neorealism is not beneficial to the Russian gas market. 
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V. Conclusion 
In conclusion of this thesis, we must assess that the effects of the current changes in 
the global energy system on the Russian gas export strategy and market are 
remarkably uniform. To sum it up in one sentence, one can say that the way the 
current changes in the global energy system affect the Russian gas export market and 
strategy mostly pertain to the fact that with these changes, the mercantilist model of 
exports that they derive from their neorealist foreign policy paradigm is no longer 
sustainable.  
  In light of the current global changes, both the Russian gas market as well as 
the strategy behind it seem out-dated. The fact that the market structure has not 
significantly changed since Soviet times underlines this. Moreover, although an 
attempt was made to apply a more liberal strategy to it in the 1990s, Putin’s 
mercantilist restructuring of the market in the 00’s have created an unprecedented 
divergence between the Russian vision of the international gas market and that of its 
main exports market(s). Where its direct counterparts have been developing towards a 
more liberal, globalized and flexible gas market, Russia seems to have ignored the 
signs of the times, and continued to rely on for instance the need of high base load 
capacity, on the viability of long-term gas contracts with take or pay clauses and on 
the idea that Europe could never diversify away. 
  The current changes most certainly present a turning point in the Russian gas 
market and strategy though. The fact that the Russian leadership has also realized this 
is evident from the fact that it is trying to diversify its market through LNG and a 
focus on Asian infrastructure, and has even made a minor move towards liberalizing 
exports. However, at this point the question is not so much what Russia can actively 
do, but what Russia will be forced to do in order to be able to maintain its dominant 
position. In essence, it lost its position as a ‘market maker’ and became a ‘taker’ once 
the global energy market became more diverse and globalized.  This need not mean 
Russia’s position is the global gas market is inherently diminished however: with 
every global change that we analysed – bar the lower oil price, which has some 
specific connotations – we have seen that the Russian market need not be negatively 
affected per se, lest Russia is willing to revise its strategy.  
  When we look at the globalization of the gas market and the opportunity that 
this offers to the EU in terms of diversifying away from Russia, the need to adapt 
could not be clearer. As it are strategic considerations rather than price levels or 
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physical accessibility that take precedence in the EU’s diversification strategy, Russia 
is effectively only left one choice: liberalize or lose market share. The fact that in 
order to shore up LNG production for the Asian market, Russia has already somewhat 
liberalized LNG exports, does not only underline the importance of further 
liberalization, but also shows that the Russian leadership is quite aware of the need to 
modernize, i.e. become more flexible and adapt to current (liberal) standards. If it 
would manage to do so, there is little indication of the fact that Russia would then not 
be able to maintain and gain a dominant role in both markets, albeit with less direct 
control.  
  In the case of RES, there is a even a stronger case to be made that any 
negative effects could not only be mitigated by adapting to a more flexible and liberal 
system, but could even be turned into a direct positive in all export markets that are 
RES heavy. If Russia could guarantee the competitiveness of its gas exports vis a vis 
other back-up fuels, whilst letting go of the idea that take or pay clauses are still 
realistic in a system without a consistent base load demand, there is ample 
opportunity for Russian gas to still take its place of honour next to RES as its most 
fitting complementary fuel. However, the need to alter its strategy is again strong in 
this case, since long-term gas contract a la Russe do not agree with systems heavy on 
RES. 
  More complex is the effect of the lower oil price. Essentially, this has proven 
to be a relatively positive development for Russia: exports went up and protests 
against its preferred contractual structure went down. When we look at the 
consequences of the decreased revenues from fossil fuels however, the story become 
more opaque. Firstly, it will have a guaranteed negative impact on its future market, 
as the combination of a lack of funds and the sanctions make development of new 
fields very difficult. Secondly however, due to an inherent lack of Western 
involvement as a result of the sanctions, Russia’s strategy will not be affected at all. 
However, this ‘benefit’ is easily outweighed by the risk of potential future shortages, 
and essentially indicate that Russia should have moved towards a more liberal model 
a long time ago, as it were neorealist foreign policy measures that exposed its gas 
market to this much risk. 
  The compounded effects of the current changes in the global energy system 
have thus created a brave new world for one of its main actors. In its current shape 
and form, based on a neorealist perception of the world and subsequent mercantilist 
Julie Jojo Nielen, 1169785  
 
	 55	
economic vision, Russia will most certainly not be able to maintain its position as the 
world’s most prominent gas exporter. If it would prove willing to reassess its strategy 
however, and adapt to the liberal and dynamic atmosphere of the new global energy 
system, the future of the Russian gas market might yet very bright.   
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